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The Problem of Freight Car Supply 
By John Richard FeIton* 
Summary 
As early as 1907 the Interstate Commerce Commission held 
extensive hearings on freight car shortages. At frequent inter-
vals ever since, Congress and the commission have addressed 
themselves to the problem of freight car supply with considerable 
vigor but meager results. 
Allegations of an inadequate supply of freight cars have 
been widespread in recent years. The decline in the number of 
freight cars is easy to document: between 1959 and 1968, the 
number of cars used in grain transport (boxcars and covered 
hopper cars) declined by 26 '7r. 
If, however, consideration is given to changes in car capacity 
and car miles per day, then grain car supply, as measured by 
ton-miles of grain transported, actually increased by 14 % during 
this 10-year period. 
Furthermore, a study conducted by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in 1969 revealed that, on an average day in 1968, 
there were three boxcar I? and covered hopper cars available in the 
Midwest Region for everyone ordered by shippers. Neverthe-
less, on this same average day, shippers received only 75 to 80% 
of the freight cars ordered, owing to malfunctioning of the car 
allocation system. 
When freight cars move beyond the lines of the owning rail-
road, the railroad having possession must pay the owning rail-
road a car-rental charge known as "per diem." The Association 
of American Railroads and the Interstate Commerce Commission 
have relied upon an inflexible and inadequate car-rental charge 
and a comprehensive body of "car-service rules" and "car-service 
orders" to secure return of freight cars to owning roads or to 
points of greatest "need," as defined by the AAR and the ICC. 
Thus car allocation, at least during periods of heavy demand, is 
reminiscent of the decision-making process in a centrally planned 
socialist system. 
If a car-rental exchange market were to be established, car-
rental rates would be determined by competitive bidding. Freight 
cars would then move toward p-.9ints of greatest shipper demand 
* Professor of Economics, University of Nebraska. The research for 
this bulletin was performed while the author held a summer appointment 
in the Department of Agricultural Economics. 
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and the ICC would find it unnecessary to issue arbitrary orders 
to influence car distribution. 
Moreover, whenever such competitively-determined rates 
rose above the prospective daily ownership costs of new freight 
cars, it would provide an incentive for the acquisition of addi-
tional freight cars. Such a car-rental exchange market could be 
administered by the Car Service Division of the AAR, free from 
the political considerations which now play a major role in 
freight car distribution. 
Introduction 
With the certainty usually attributed only to death and 
taxes, the problem of "freight car shortages" can be expected to 
manifest itself in various places and at various times during the 
course of each year. Shippers in the Great Plains states, particu-
larly, have had frequent occasion to decry their inability to se-
cure boxcars in sufficient numbers to transport grain at harvest 
time. As former Representative Clair Callan testified before the 
Freight Car Shortage Subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Commerce: 
"In my hometown of Odell, Neb., on last Dec. 3 [1964], 
there was still milo piled on Main Street. This situation was 
duplicated in several other towns. The Burlington Railroad esti-
mated that more than 20 million bushels of grain sorghum was 
piled on the ground in their service area alone because of the 
boxcar shortage."1 
During the course of the same hearings, Gordon E. Ganka, 
then transportation director, Lincoln Grain, Inc., pointed out 
that in October, 1964, the railroads were able to supply only 68 
cars in good condition to m~et the 1,167 requested, i.e. 5.8%. The 
following month, November, 1964, of the 1,627 empty cars or-
dered, only 122 cars in good condition, or 7.4%, were supplied.2 
The comments of shippers, railroad executives and regula-
tory officials since the 1965 hearings of the Senate Freight Car 
Shortage Subcommittee do not suggest that the situation has 
improved. In June, 1966, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
estimated the daily freight car shortage to be as high as 15,000 
cars, compared with a maximum of 10,665 cars in all of 1965. 
1 Clair Callan, "Statement," F'1'eight Car Shortages, hearing.s before the 
Freight Car Shortage Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. 
Senate, 89th Congress, 1st session, in S. 179 and S. 1098, Sec. 89-23 (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1965), pp. 271-4. 
2 Gordon E. Ganka, "Statement," F'reight Car Shortages, p. 319. Pre-
sumably, monthly car orders are not cumulative; the November, 1964, 
deficiency was 1,627 - 122 = 1,505, yet the total empty cars ordered for 
December, 1964, was only 1,497 .. 
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The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, alone, re-
ported a weekly shortage of 3,000 grain-loading freight cars.3 
In November, 1968, a representative of the Rock Island de-
clared: "This is our most critical shortage of any time in the 
t f · s "4 pas lve year. 
Finally, 54 of 77 large shippers who responded to a poll con-
duced by Railway Age in April, 1969, maintained that the freight 
car supply problem was worse than during the preceding year. 
Moreover, the cars in shortest supply were those employed in 
grain transport: boxcars and covered hopper cars.5 
"Shortage" is not a popular word in the economist's dic-
tionary and he typically attributes this to a failure of the price 
mechanism to perform its equilibrating role. Is this the essence 
of the problem of freight car shortages? Let us consider the 
nature of the demand for and supply of freight cars and the 
operation of the associated price system. 
The Short-Run Supply of Freight Cars 
The "demand" for freight cars can be interpreted both as 
the demand of shippers for existing cars and the demand of rail-
roads, car-leasing companies and shippers for new or rebuilt 
cars. Thus, there are reall,y two freight car markets, one for the 
existing fleet and one for additions to the fleet. Let us consider 
the supply characteristics of the market for the existing fleet. 
The short-run supply of freight cars cannot be evaluated 
merely by counting. Cars are not homogeneous as to type or 
carrying capacity and intertemporal comparisons must take into 
consideration changes in the capacity of the average car of a 
particular type, in the composition of the fleet and in the per-
centage of serviceable cars. Thus, in the ten years from 1959 
through 1968, while the total number of freight cars owned by 
Class I railroads declined from 1,676,386 to only 1,453,883 or by 
more than 13 %, the aggregate carrying capacity of these cars 
actually increased from 9214 million tons to 931;2 million tons.6 
Furthermore, if the reduction in the percentage of unser-
viceable freight cars from 7.7% of the fleet in 1959 to 4.8% in 
3 Wall St1'eet Jou1'nal, June 3, 1966, p. 1, Col. 6. 
4 Wall Street Journal, November 6, 1968, p. 30, Col. l. 
iI "April Traffic Poll: Shortages Continue to Plague Shippers," Rail-
way Age (April 28, 1969), p. 31. 
6 AAR, Statistics of Railroads of Class I in the United States, Years 
1.958 to 1.96.9 (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 9. Class I railroads, those having 
annual operating revenues of $5,000,000 or more, account for 99% of all 
revenue ton miles of traffic in the United States. The inclusion of freight 
cars owned by Clas.s II railroads, switching and terminal railroads, car-
leasing companies and shippers would have some minor effect on the totals 
but virtually no effect on percentage changes. 
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1968 is taken into account, then effective capacity increased from 
85 million tons to 89 million tons, or almost 5 % during this 
period.7 
Instantaneous capacity may, however, be a dubious method 
of calculating the short-run supply of freight cars. Shippers do 
not demand so much capacity in the abstract but rather the 
movement of so many tons of goods from one point to another. 
Therefore, the short-run supply of freight cars over any short 
time period is affected not only by aggregate freight car capacity 
but also by the extent of capacity utilized, the time required for 
loading and unloading goods, the time spent in classification 
yards and on sidings, train speed and distance. 
Between 1959 and 1968 average train speed, including time 
spent at intermediate stations and on sidings, increased from 
19.5 to 20.4 miles per hour.8 
Since the portion of the day spent in road trains increased 
from 2 hours and 21 minutes, on the average, in 1959 to 2 hours 
and 39 minutes in 1968, average daily car mileage increased from 
45.9 to 53.9, or about 17% 0/0, during this ten-year period.9 
Ton mileage has been further augmented by an increase in 
the percentage of capacity utilized by the average loaded car 
from 79.1 in 1959 to 80.4 in 1968.10 Also, the length of the aver-
age haul has increased from 448 miles in 1959 to 492 miles in 
1968.11 
A final consideration is the change in the ratio of empty 
to loaded car miles. Here the change is unfavorable, the ratio of 
empty to loaded car miles increasing from 60.50/0 in 1959 to 
68.70/0 in 1968.12 
The net result of all these factors can be ascertained by com-
paring revenue ton-miles in 1959 with those in 1968. Revenue 
ton-miles increased from 576,529 million in 1959 to 744,479 mil-
lion in 1968.13 
Thus, while the number of freight cars of all kinds decreased 
by more than 130/0 between 1959 and 1968, the ton-miles per 
freight car day increased by 43 0/0,14 so that total freight car pro-
ductivity increased by 29 %. 
7 AAR, Yearbook of Railroad Facts (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 58. 
8 Ibid., p. 52. 
9 Ibid., p. 55. 
10 Ibid., pp. 50 and 66. 
11 Ibid., p. 41. 
12 AAR, Statistics of Railroads of Class I, p. 11. The increase in the 
empty-loaded car mileage ratio is probably attributable to increased spe-
cialization in the freight car fleet which reduces, where it does not eliminate, 
the utilization of cars in back-hauls. 
13 AAR, Yearbook of Railroad Facts, p. 35. 
14 Ibid., p. 56. 
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Of particular interest in the Great Plains area is the supply 
of boxcars and covered hopper cars, since they are employed in 
the transportation of grain to consumption and export points. 
Between 1959 and 1968 the number of boxcars and covered hop-
per cars declined by 26 % but the aggregate capacity of these 
cars declined less than 13 %. 
This difference is attributable, in part, to the increase in the 
average capacity of boxcars from 49.2 tons in 1959 to 52.9 tons 
in 1968 and covered hopper cars from 68.8 tons to 84.7 tons dur-
ing the same period. The remainder of the difference between 
the change in number and the change in capacity of these cars 
arises from the change in the ratio of covered hopper cars to 
boxcars. In 1959, the ratio was] /11 ; in 1968 the ratio was 3/10. 
Moreover, if the reduction in the percentage of unservice-
able boxcars and covered hopper cars approximated that for 
the fleet as a whole, then available capacity declined by less than 
10 %. Finally, if boxcars and covered hopper cars traveled at the 
same train speed, spent the same portion of the day in road trains, 
achieved the same increase in the percentage of car capacity 
utilized, enjoyed the same increase in length of average haul and 
suffered the same decrease in empty/loaded car ratio as the aver-
age of the entire fleet, the revenue ton-miles of freight trans-
ported by boxcars and covered hopper cars would have increased 
from 221,964 in 1959 to 253,767 in 1968 or by more than 14%.15 
Methods of Improving Freight Car Utilization 
While the foregoing considerations provide us with little 
evidence as to the adequacy of the freight car fleet, in general, 
or boxcars and covered hopper cars, in particular, they do sug-
gest that the short-run supply of cars cannot be ascertained 
merely by a process of car enumeration. It might also be noted 
that potential car productivity cannot be determined by measur-
ing current car productivity. 
Principal opportunities for the enhancement of car produc-
tivity would appear to be: 
An increase in the percentage of the day during which a car 
is part of a road train. 
A decrease in the empty/loaded car ratio. 
15 Given the foregoing assumptions, the revenue ton-miles of freight 
transported by boxcars and covered hopper cars in any year would be the 
ratio of the combined carrying capacities of boxcars and covered hopper 
cars to the carrying capacity of the entire freight-car fleet multiplied by 
the revenue ton-miles accomplished that year by the whole fleet. 
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"Free Time" and Demurrage Modifications 
The average freight car moves only about 54 miles a day 
which, at an average train speed of about 20% miles an hour, it 
can accomplish in about two hours and forty minutes. The re-
mainder of the time it is being held by shippers, consignees or 
the railroad itself in terminals, classification yards, repair shops 
and so forth. 
One device for reducing loading and unloading delays would 
be the elimination of all so-called "free time" for such operations. 
The present practice of 1 or 2 working days within which one 
may load or unload without payment of demurrage provides no in-
centive for loading or unloading prior tcdhe end of this period.16 
Either demurrage, which would begin as soon as the car 
comes into the possession of the shipper or consignee, or, alter-
natively, a refund of a portion of the transportation charge for 
return of the car before the termination of the existing "free 
period," would provide an incentive for speedier loading and 
unloading operations. 
Seasonally Variable Freight Rates 
The portion of the year which the average freight car is in 
the possession of shippers and consignees is greatly exceeded by 
the time it is held idle by the railroads themselves.H 
A primary reason for the existence of unused freight car 
capacity at various periods would appear to be seasonal fluctua-
tions in demand coupled with the simultaneity of production and 
consumption of transportation service. In 1968 grain and grain 
product carloadings in the week of Nov. 2, the 1968 peak, ex-
ceeded those of the week of Dec. 28, the 1968 low, by 101.2%, 
those of the week of June 1 by 85.9;7r and those of the average 
week by 33 %. Furthermore, the second and third weeks' most 
numerous grain and grain product carloadings occurred the 
week preceding and the week succeeding the peak week.18 
An obvious method of improving freight car utilization 
would be through the institution of seasonably variable freight 
rates. Fifteen years ago, George H. Borts pointed out: "If the 
16 Cf. John G. Kneiling, "How Not to Solve the Freight Car Problem," 
Trains (April, 1968), p. 37. 
17 In 1967, inactive car days, including car repair, accounted for 38% 
of the time of the average freight car while only 18% of the time was 
devoted to loading and unloading operations. See Patrick P. Boles and John 
O. Gerald, "Demurrage and the Freight Car Situation," Marketing and 
Transportation Situation, MTS 174 (Washington: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, August, 1969), p. 34. 
18 AAR, Cars of Revenue Freight Loaded, 1968-1969, CS 54-B (Wash-
ington, D.C., Jan. 13, 1969), p. 2. 
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present (railway) pncmg system were replaced by one under 
which customers were charged more for service during peak 
periods, they would have an incentive to even out their demand 
over time."19 
More recently George W. Wilson has argued the case for 
seasonal freight rates: 
"The problem is essentially this: Marginal cost is higher at 
the peak when excess capacity is low than it is at other times 
when excess capacity is greater. Thus, to induce shippers to 
utilize transport equipment more fully during the year, there 
should be seasonal rates rising with the off-peak periods. 
" ... raising the rates at the peak and lowering them at 
other times will induce those shippers whose ... elasticity of 
transport demand is high. . . to reschedule their traffic insofar 
as possible. This will lead to a reduction in peak traffic. 
"On the other hand, business in off-peak periods will in-
crease due to two factors: the shift of some shippers from peak 
to off-peak and the general increase in demand for transport due 
to lower rates at the off-peak periods."20 
While seasonally variable rates would be a novelty in rail-
road transportation, they are a familiar characteristic of the 
exempt sector of highway transportation. The Marketing Eco-
nomics Division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in a 
survey of truck brokers of agricultural commodities several 
years ago, found rather substantial seasonal fluctuations in the 
rates for the transportation of produce and grain. 
For example, in 1959, the range in the rate for the trans-
portation of wheat from Topeka, Ran., to Atlanta, Ga., was 280/0 ; 
the range for oats from Omaha, Nebr., to Dallas, Texas, was 
40 % ; the range for corn from Omaha to Los Angeles was 27 % ; 
the range of wheat from Wichita Falls, Texas, to Los Angeles 
was 400/0. 21 
While freedom from rate regulation, particularly the re-
quirement that rates be published well in advance of any changes 
therein, might facilitate the adoption of seasonably variable 
rates, it would not guarantee it. On the other hand, the existence 
of regulation does not preclude it. William G. Shepherd reports 
19 George H. Borts, "Increasing Returns in the Railway Industry," 
Journal of Political Economy (August, 1954), p. 328. 
20 George W. Wilson, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions in the Eco-
nomics of Transportation (Bloomington, Indiana: Foundations for Eco-
nomic and Business Studies, Indiana University, 1962), pp. 74-5. 
21 Marketing Economics Division, ERS, The Role of Truck Brokers in 
the Movement of Exempt Agricultural Commodities, Marketing Research 
Report No. 525 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1962) 
pp. 25-7. 
9 
that about 8 or 9 % of the electric utilities which he surveyed 
made extensive use of marginal-cost pricing principles, including 
peak and off-peak pricing policies.22 Furthermore, the evening, 
night and holiday telephone rate reductions instituted by Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Co. were not negated by the 
Federal Communications Commission. 
The institution of seasonal railroad rates would presumably 
depress and spread the peak demand for freight cars. Shippers 
with more elastic demands for transport would either modify 
production schedules or adjust inventory practices so as to reduce 
shipments during the period of peak demand. For grain products 
this would most likely entail an increase in storage facilities 
near points of origin.23 
Seasonally Variable Per Diem Rates 
In addition to the improvements in freight car utilization 
realizable through peak-load pricing of transportation service, 
very significant gains could also be achieved through a similar 
reformation of the car-rental, or per diem, system. 
The earning capacity of a car is a reflection of freight rates 
and the extent of car utilization. Therefore, the demand of rail-
roads for freight cars will exhibit the same seasonal pattern as 
the demand of shippers for transport service. 
Furthermore, the rationale for seasonably variable per 
diem rates is identical to the rationale for flexible freight rates. 
As Burton A. Weisbrod has observed: 
"At whatever level the per diem rental charge may be fixed, 
this level will almost certainly be above or below, but not at, the 
free market equilibrium price at any particular time. In other 
words, an inflexible charge, regardless of its level, is both a 
ceiling and a floor price and will exhibit the familiar effects of 
both."24 
Weisbrod hypothesized that, during periods of greater than 
normal shipper demand, a railroad in possession of foreign cars 
would find it profitable to divert such cars to its own use and 
22 William G. Shepherd, "Marginal Cost Pricing in American Utilities," 
Southern Economic Journal (August, 1966), pp. 64-5. 
23 It might be noted, parenthetically, that the economies of unit train 
transportation of grain constitutes further encouragement to the location 
of grain storage facilities in grain-growing areas rather than near points 
of consumption. John Richard Felton, "Technological Change and Internal 
Economies in Railroad Transport," Amcrican Journal of Agricultural 
Economics (August, 1968), p. 730. 
24 Burton H. Weisbrod, "The Per Diem Freight Car Rate and Railroad 
Efficiency-The Short-Run Problem," JOllnwl of Business (October, 1959), 
p.383. 
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pay the per diem charge rather than to return the cars to the 
home road. Conversely, in periods of less than normal demand, 
foreign cars would be returned to the home road to avoid per 
diem charges. Thus empty car mileage would rise at such time 
in the process of transferring cars from one location where they 
were in surplus to another place where they were equally likely 
to lie idle. 
A comparison of empty/loaded freight car ratios in years of 
expanding and contracting economic activity tended to confirm 
the hypothesis of an inverse relation between level of economic 
activity and the empty/loaded car ratio.2:) 
More than 60 years ago the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion gave serious consideration to the adoption of seasonally 
variable per diem rates. The commission, in commenting on the 
increase in per diem charges from 20¢ to 50¢ instituted by more 
than 100 railroads, conceded that "this will be effective in secur-
ing return of cars to the owning railroads during the few months 
of the year when traffic is light ... but that it will insure 
return during times of great need is not likely, for in such times 
the holder could earn perhaps ten times the amount he would be 
compelled to pay by using the foreign car."2G 
Car Service Rules and Orders 
As a matter of fact, the railroads have not relied primarily 
on per diem rates to govern car allocation. Car movement, 
rather, has been made subject to a comprehensive body of regu-
lations of the Association of American Railroads known as "car 
service rules." The underlying principle of these rules, as 
Eugene W. Coughlin has observed, is that "a railroad buying 
cars to serve its shippers is entitled to a reasonably prompt 
return of the cars after they have moved beyond the owner's 
rails, but that this return should, to the greatest practicable 
extent, be under load, to keep empty car haulage to a minimum, 
and even though this process of loading might involve some delay 
25 Ibid., pp. 384-5. 
26 In the Matter of Cal' Shortages and Other Insufficient Transporta-
tion Facilities, 12 ICC 561, 573 (1907). The commission suggested that 
50¢ might well be regarded as a minimum per diem rate and that a rate 
as high as $2 a day could be established during the period of greatest 
demand in the latter half of the year. Lac. cit. The Association of Ameri-
can Railroads did experiment with seasonally variable per diem rates for 
foreign freight cars during the years 1910 to 1913. The difference between 
the March to July rate and the August to February rate was so small, 30¢ 
and 35¢, respectively, that its effect could not have been pronounced. 
Leonor F. Loree, Railroad Freight Transp01'tation (New York: D. Appleton 
and Co., 1922), p. 389. 
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and circuity in returning the cars to the owner."27 
More specifically, the AAR's rules provide that "foreign 
cars shall be loaded to the fullest extent possible to, toward or 
via the owning road, and system (home) cars shall not be loaded 
off owners' rails when the use of foreign cars, properly applica-
ble under these rules, is practicable."28 
Whatever the merit of the principle embodied in the rules, 
and this will be examined later, the rules themselves suffer two 
basic shortcomings: 
1. They are not enforceable. 
2. They are regularly superseded during periods of heavy 
shipper demand by "car service orders." 
Car service orders typically require Eastern roads to effect 
certain reductions in the number of Western cars on their lines 
or to deliver a certain number of freight cars of a particular kind 
or kinds to specified railroads at particular junctions within a 
given period of time without regard to ownership.29 
While AAR car service orders, like AAR car service rules, 
are not enforceable, the Interstate Commerce Commission has 
authority to issue binding orders, violation of which will subject 
the violator to substantial penalties.30 
In summary, it seems appropriate to characterize railroad 
freight car allocation in the United States as based on the own-
ership principle, modified by notions of efficiency in car utiliza-
tion, and overlaid by authoritative determinations as to shipper 
needs. Thus, car allocation, at least during periods of heavy 
demand, is reminiscent of the decision-making process in a 
centrally planned socialistic system. 
As a consequence, it should occasion no surprise that car 
allocation has been the subject of unceasing controversy for 
decades, that much unnecessary empty car movement takes place 
and that the distribution of cars may bear slight resemblance to 
one governed by market principles. The elements of an accept-
able system of car allocation will be discussed after the market 
for the sale of new and rebuilt freight cars has been explored. 
The Long-Run Supply of Freight Cars 
In addition to the problem of effective utilization of the 
existing freight car fleet, there is the crucial issue of the ade-
27 Coughlin, op. cit., p. 5. 
28 Ibid., p. 9. 
29 Ibid., pp. 211-2. 
30 The authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix per 
diem rates, promulgate car service rules, issue car allocation orders and 
impose penalties for violation was established by the Car Service Act of 
1917, 40 United States Statutes at Large, Part I, pp. 101-2. 
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quacy of the fleet itself. Allegations of an inadequate total supply 
of freight cars have been widespread in recent years. The 
Comptroller General of the United States, in a letter to the 
Senate Committee on Commerce on March 8, 1965, referred to the 
national freight car shortage as a "matter of public knowledge."31 
The following June the Committee on Commerce submitted 
a report which declared: "Car shortages, which once were con-
fined to the Midwest during harvest seasons, have become in-
creasingly more frequent, more severe and nationwide in scope 
as the national freight car supply has plummeted."32 
As to the magnitUde of the shortages, the report maintains: 
"Already this year, before the beginning of the harvest season, 
shippers are demanding 7,500 cars more daily than the railroads 
can provide. Over the past 20 weeks, boxcar shortages have 
averaged more than 4,000 cars short per day. Gondola shortages 
have averaged well over 1,300 daily and flatcar shortages have 
exceeded 300 per day in this same period."33 
The ICC Study of Freight Car Supply 
Despite the foregoing allegations, the recent hearings on 
freight car supply conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on 
Surface Transportation tend to cast some doubt on the thesis that 
the railroad industry suffers from a secular deficiency in freight 
cars. The Interstate Commerce Commission required all Class I 
and Class II railroads to submit information on car orders and 
supply for each of 12 randomly selected days over a 12-month 
period, specifically, Jan. 29, 1968, to Jan. 23, 1969. 
Although the commission did find the railroads' perfor-
mance to be "inadequate throughout 1968 in most regions of the 
country," it conceded that "the regional problem is not so much 
the availability of sufficient cars to fill current shippers' orders 
as the use of the cars within a region."34 
The commission continued: "Even in regions where the sup-
plying of a type of car to fill shippers' requests involved the 
greatest delay, availability in general was at least twice the 
31 Joseph Campbell, Comptroller General of the United States, letter 
to Warren G. Magnuson, chairman, Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 
dated May 6, 1965, in Freight Car Shortages, Senate Report No. 386, 89th 
Congress, 1st Session, June 30, 1965, p. 10. 
32 Ibid., p. 1-2. 
33 Ibid., p. 3. 
34 Report of the Results of Freight Car Stndy in Ex Pa~·te No. 252 
(Sub. No.1), Appendix A, Freight Car Supply, Hearing before the Sub-
committee on Surface Transportation of the Committee in Commerce, 
United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st session, May 13, 1969 (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1969), p. 9. 
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Table 1. Plain boxcars and covered hopper cars available, ordered 
deficiency and surplus in Midwest Region,1 Jan. 29, 1968, to Jan: 
23,1969 
General service boxcars 






daily of total daily of total 
number available number available 
In hands of railroads at 
beginning of day (a) 16,059 71.7 8,140 72.1 
Received by railroads 
during day (b) 6,351 28.3 3,147 27.9 
Total available 
to railroads 
(c) = (a) + (b) 22,410 100.0 11,287 100.0 
Cars ordered 
by shippers (d) 6,305 28.1 3,624 32.1 
Net surplus 
(e) = (c) - (d) 16,105 71.9 7,663 67.9 
Total deficiency (f) 1,567 7.0 748 6.6 
Total surplus 
(g) = (d) + (f) 17,672 78.9 8,411 74.5 
1 The Midwest Region consists of Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 
Source: Report of the Results of Freight Car Study in Ex Parte No. 252 (Sub No.1), 
Appendix A, Freight Car Supply, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Sur-
face Transportation of the Committee of Commerce, United States Senate, 91st 
Congress, 1st Session, May 13, 1969 (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 31-2. 
current orders ... [I]t appears that, on an annual basis, the 
problem is not primarily one of inter-regional distribution of 
cars."35 
Furthermore, where deficiencies in car supply were present, 
they usually were of relatively short duration. As the commis-
sion put it: "For most car types in most zones less than 3 % of 
the orders were unfilled after 4 days delay."36 
The relationship of boxcars and covered hopper cars ordered 
to those available in the Midwest Region and the days of delay in 
filling these orders are set forth in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
Table 1 reveals that there were three boxcars and covered hopper 
cars to everyone ordered by shippers on an average day in 1968. 
Nevertheless, owing to maldistribution within the region, there 
were still deficiencies in car availability equal to 20 to 25 % of 
the cars ordered. On the other hand, the delays in filling orders 
do not generally seem to have been lengthy. Almost 80% of car 
orders were filled with less than one day's delay and more than 
97 'Ie were filled within four days. 
35 Loc. cit. 
36 Ibid., p. 12. 
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Table 2. Plain boxcars and covered hopper cars distributed by number of 
days' delay in Midwest Region. Jan. 29, 1968, to Jan. 23, 1969. 
General service boxcars 
(unequipped) Covered hopper cars 
Days delayed Number Percent Number Percent 
Total 1,114,296 100.0 739,464 100.0 
No. of days' delay: 
886,728 79.6 590,472 79.9 Less than 1 day 
1 - 2 days 143,424 12.9 124,680 16.9 
3- 4 days 52,392 4.7 12,648 1.7 
5- 6 days 11,568 1.1 5,424 0.7 
7- 8 days 7,968 0.7 2,232 0.3 
9 - 10 days 7,152 0.6 2,304 0.3 
11 - 12 days 1,416 0.1 480 1 
More than 12 days 3,648 0.3 1,224 0.2 
Ave. No. of days delayed 1.06 0.88 
1 Less than 1/10 of 1% 
No.1), Source: Report oj Results of Freight Car Study in Ex Parte No. 252 (Sub 
Appendix A, Freight Car Supply. pp. 50 and 68. 
Another reason for doubt as to the existence of a serious 
over-all deficiency in freight cars is the relative ease with which 
ralroad equipment can be financed. As Gilbert Burck has com-
mented: 
"Since locomotives and cars can be repossessed, financing 
them is almost risk-free . . . so during the past decade the 
carriers spent an average of more than $900 million a year on 
locomotives and cars. But other investment, such as new yards 
and line revisions, had to come largely out of cash flow and 
amounted to only $300 million a year."37 
The Economic Test of Freight Car Adequacy 
While the foregoing considerations may raise doubts as to 
the existence of a long-run freight car shortage, they are cer-
tainly not controlling. 
The crucial issue is: Do the railroads, as a group, have the 
incentive to invest in freight cars up to the point that the dis-
counted expected future earnings of such equipment will equal 
the prevailing rate of interest? 
The answer is: It all depends upon the relationship of the 
per diem rate to expected daily ownership costs to the home road. 
Even though per diem payments cancel out for the railroad sys-
tem, as a whole, they play a crucial role in the investment 
decision process. 
If the per diem rate is insufficient to defray expected daily 
ownership costs of newly acquired cars, then railroads will need 
37 Gilbert Burck, "The Railroads are Running Scared," Fortune (June, 
1969), pp. 123-4. 
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to anticipate earnings for home line use in excess of the prevail-
ing rate of interest before undertaking such investment. 
By the same token, if the per diem rate is more than suffi-
cient to defray expected daily ownership costs of new freight 
cars, then an anticipated rate of return for home line use of 
less than the prevailing interest rate will still induce new car 
purchases.38 
It should be emphasized that any "shortage" in the over-all 
supply of freight cars is relative to a given level of effectiveness 
in the utilization of existing equipment. This follows from the 
definition of a shortage as an excess in the expected rate of 
return from the home line use of new equipment over the pre-
vailing rate of interest. Thus, an improvement in car utilization 
could easily transform the shortage into a surplus by depressing 
the anticipated earnings of further additions to the fleet. 
The underlying conditions for a shortage would not pre-
sumably have been removed by such improved utilization, how-
ever, and, in the absence of further change, freight car additions 
would be curtailed until anticipated earnings from the home line 
use of new equipment once more rose sufficiently above the 
appropriate discount rate to establish a new equilibrium. 
From this it can be concluded that a solution to the problem 
of an adequate freight car supply necessitates a simultaneous 
attack upon car utilization and the size of the fleet itself. 
If, for example, the per diem rate is less than the current 
expected daily ownership costs of a particular freight car, 
equating the per diem rate with such ownership costs so as to 
encourage increased car ownership is inappropriate so long as 
the utilization of the existing fleet is unsatisfactory. In short, 
neither the problem of car utilization nor of fleet size can be 
solved in isolation. 
The Inadequacy of the Per Diem Rate 
The next question is: Has the per diem rate generally been 
of sufficient magnitude to cover prospective daily ownership 
costs of new equipment? 
The answer, it would appear, is "no." 
On the basis of a cross-section analysis of the relationship 
between car maintenance costs and car age and of various as-
sumptions as to car life, car prices and the rate of interest, Grun-
feld found that the per diem rate in effect from Jan. 1, 1957, to 
38 Cf. Yehuda Grunfeld, "The Effect of the Per Diem Rate on the 
Efficiency and Size of the American Railroad Freight Car Fleet," Jonrnal 
of Business (January, 1959), p. 56. 
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Dec. 1, 1959, viz., $2.75, would justify the purchase of a $10,000 
car only if the rate of interest were 3 % and the certain life of 
the car was 50 years. It would justify the purchase of a car last-
ing 20 years only if the interest rate were 3 % and the car cost 
no more than $7,000. At 61'0 a $6,000 car could be justified only 
if it would last for 50 years.39 
As of Jan. 1, 1964, a system of multi-level per diem rates 
was adopted by the Association of American Railroads. Rather 
than a single per diem rate, a series of per diem rates, which 
varied with the depreciated original cost per car, was established. 
The following year, the number of per diem groups was increased 
from 6 to 9, with the per diem rate varying from $2.16 for a car 
having an unamortized cost of $1,000 to $12.18 for one whose 
original cost less depreciation was currently more than $35,000.40 
Robert Tosterud has computed the rate of return to the 
owner of a freight car used exclusively on foreign lines, pursuant 
to the foregoing multi-level per diem schedule. He notes that, for 
a $19,000 freight car having a life of 30 years, the rate of return, 
even with zero maintenance and repair, is still only 31'0.41 
On Jan. 30, 1968, the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., et.a!., v. New 
York, Susquehanna and Western Railroad Co., et.al.,42 promul-
gated a car-rental charge combining per diem and mileage 
charges. Some 21 cost bracket groups were established, the first 
bracket representing cars of less than $1,000 in value and the 
remaining brackets characterized by $2,000 class intervals. 
Mileage charges were to vary with the cost bracket and the time 
charge with both the cost bracket and the age of the freight car.43 
39 Grunfeld, op. cit., pp. 62-3. The average cost of new boxcars at the 
time Grunfeld was writing (1959) was $9,851, while covered hopper cars 
cost an average of $11,532. ICC, Transport Statistics in the United States, 
Part I, Railroads, Release 2 (Washington, D.C., 1960) p. 28. An expected 
life of 30 years would probably have been a reasonable one in 1959. While 
some 22% of all freight cars were 30 years of age or over in 1959, the 
average age was 18% years at a time when the freight-car fleet had been 
undergoing more or less continuous contraction for a number of years. 
American Railway Car Institute, Railroad Car Facts, 1959 (New York: 
1960), pp. 2-4, and ICC, Transport Statistics in the United States, Part I, 
Railroads, Final Release (Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 50. 
40 The complete per diem schedule is set forth in AAR, Code of Car 
Service Rules, Code of Per Diem Rules, Circular OT-I0-B (Washington, 
D.C., 1968), p. 6. 
41 Robert J. Tosterud, Economics of the Boxcar Supply (Unpublished 
M.S. thesis; Fargo, N.D.: North Dakota State University, 1969), p. 136. 
42 332 ICC 176 (1968) 
43 Ibid., pp. 242-3. 
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In the future, the mileage and per diem rates were to be 
computed from cost data for the most recent four-year period44 
and yield a 670 rate of return on depreciated original cost.4 ;; 
This most recent system of freight car-rental payments, 
while it considers more fully the variables involved in owner-
ship costs, nonetheless continues to construe those costs as past, 
not prospective. Certainly, a 670 rate of return on original cost 
will not compensate an owner of a new freight car who must 
borrow at 8% % or more. 
It should be pointed out, in this connection, that Congress 
has conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission, pur-
suant to Public Law 89-430 of May 26, 1966, authority to impose 
so-called "incentive" per diem charges over and above the own-
ership costs of freight cars. 
The commission could prescribe such increased compensa-
tion whenever, in its judgment, such incentive element would 
"provide just and reasonable compensation to freight car owners, 
contribute to sound car service practices (including efficient 
utilization and distribution of cars), and encourage the acquisi-
tion and maintenance of a car supply adequate to meet the needs 
of commerce and the national defense."46 
In Ex Parte No. 252, Incentive Per Diem Charges, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission on Oct. 3, 1967, discontinued a pro-
ceeding for the imposition of interim incentive per diem charges 
on the ground that existing information on unfilled orders was' 
inadequate to fulfill statutory standards.47 
Furthermore, an even more comprehensive study of freight 
car supply was ordered by the commission for 1969-1970.48 
Whatever the study reveals with respect to car deficiencies and 
surpluses, it will be of doubtful relevance insofar as determining 
an appropriate per diem rate is concerned. 
44 Ibid., p. 230. 
45 Ibid., p. 213. 
46 80 Stat. 168 (1966). 
47 322 ICC 11, 17 (1967). Subsequent to the time the foregoing para-
graphs were written, a schedule of incentive per diem charges for general 
service unequipped boxcars was adopted by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in Ex Parte No. 252 (Sub. No.1). Pursuant to this order, the 
incentive chaJ:ges in effect from September through February of each 
year would yield the owners of boxcars on foreign lines an 18% return 
during these months, or an average annual return of 12%. The net credit 
balance accruing to any railroad from these incentive charges is to be 
employed only for the purpose of acquiring boxcars over and above such 
railroad's average additions in the preceding five years. ICC, Ex Parte No. 
252 (Sub. No.1), decided April 28, 1970 (April 30, 1970), Appendix B, 
pp. 3-4. 
48 Order, Ex Parte No. 252 (Sub. No.1), Incentive Per Diem Charges, 
1968 (Jan. 2~ 1969). 
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A Proposed Solution 
The customary method for accomplishing the transfer of 
privately produced goods and services in the United States is 
through the operation of a market for their sale or rental. What-
ever may be the influence of the individual buyer or seller upon 
the sale price or the rental charge, all such transactions have 
the important merit of being voluntary. 
Owing to the fact that connecting and terminating carriers 
of interline shipments are involuntary renters of freight cars, 
the utilization of the market mechanism to establish the rental 
charge for freight cars would appear, on the face of it, to be 
inappropriate. How can the rental charge be determined by the 
forces of the market when one of the parties, the railroad receiv-
ing a foreign car, cannot refuse to enter into the transaction? 
While the involuntary nature of the existing car-rental sys-
tem would appear to weigh against a market for the allocation 
of freight cars, the creation of a market in which prospective 
renters and owners would be free to participate or refrain from 
participating is, nonetheless, a distinct possibility. 
Insofar as the initial movement of a freight car to an off-
line destination is involved, the participating railroads are stili 
free to negotiate a division of the joint rate, taking into con-
sideration the rental value of the freight cars employed in trans-
porting the goods from origin to destination. Furthermore, 
whatever the constraints on freedom of negotiation in the initial 
off-line movement, they are absent for any subsequent move-
ments of the freight car on foreign lines. 
Once a foreign car has completed its original off-line jour-
ney, its disposition could then be determined by a process of 
bidding for its use. Per diem rates would be established by the 
competition of railroads ar!d shippers for cars, and the proceeds 
would be paid to the owning railroad or private car company 
after the deduction of a broker's fee. Cars would presumably be 
rented on a delivered basis, and a mileage payment would be 
made to any carrier participating in the movement of the car to 
the location designated by the renter. 
Under such a system, cars would be classified by size and 
type and graded by quality, whenever relevant. Car rental 
charges would be a function of these variables, as well as of the 
season of the year and of the distance which the freight car must 
travel to reach the shipper. 
The Car Service Division of the AAR or some newly estab-
lished organization could undertake the creation and operation 
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of a freight car rental exchange. The Automatic Car Identifica-
tion System, which is soon to be in operation,49 should be invalu-
able in the assembly of the information necessary to operate 
such a market. 
There would appear to be a number of important advantages 
to be derived from the adoption of a market system of freight 
car rentals: 
1. The existing car fleet would be allocated on the basis of 
economic considerations of productivity rather than legal con-
siderations of ownership and administrative determinations of 
relative shipper need. Empty car mileage should be greatly re-
duced through the elimination of rules designed to move cars, 
whether loaded or empty, in the direction of the home line. 
Nevertheless, owners could always assume possession of their 
own cars merely by making a mileage payment to one of their 
own junctions. Finally, per diem rates would fluctuate with 
seasonal variations in the intensity of demand. 
2. Carriers which might not have participated in the joint 
rate for the movement of a particular carload of goods would no 
longer be charged for the privilege of transporting empty cars 
to or toward an owner's lines. As David E. Smucker, Vice Presi-
dent of Operations, Pennsylvania Railroad, remarked in the 1965 
hearings on the freight car shortage: "In view of the short haul 
we receive in the loaded movement, we should not only be re-
lieved of per diem but actually compensated by the owner for 
moving the car empty in long haul."50 
The rental system suggested here would provide such com-
pensation for all empty-haul transport. 
3. Whenever, despite improvements in car utilization, the 
anticipated proceeds from freight car rental rose above prospec-
tive ownership costs, railroads would be induced to add to the 
existing fleet. Thus, a freight car-rental exchange system would 
contribute to the simultaneous solution of the long-run, as well 
as the short-run, problem of freight car supply. 
49 Burck, op. cit., p. 191. 
50 David E. Smucker, "Statement," Freight Car Shortages, Hearings, 
pp. 100-1. 
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